Political governance, civil liberties and human capital : evaluating their effect on foreign direct investment in emerging and developing economies by Filippaios, Fragkiskos et al.
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Journal of International Business 
Studies. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Filippaios, Fragkiskos, Annan-Diab, Fatima, Hermidas, 
Amir and Theodoraki, Charikleia (2019) Political governance, civil liberties and human capital : evaluating their 
effect on foreign direct investment in emerging and developing economies. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 50(7), pp. 1103-1129. is available online at: https://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s41267-019-00239-3
Political Governance, Civil Liberties and Human Capital: Evaluating their effect on 
Foreign Direct Investment in Emerging and Developing Economies 
Professor Fragkiskos Filippaios 
Kent Business School, University of Kent1 
Kent Business School, University of Kent 
Sibson Building, Canterbury, Kent 
CT2 7FS, United Kingdom 
Tel: +44(0) 1227824222 
e-mail: f.filippaios@kent.ac.uk 
 
Dr Fatima Annan-Diab 
Kingston Business School, Kingston University 
Kingston Business School, Kingston Hill 
Kingston Upon Thames, Surrey 
KT2 7LB, United Kingdom 
Tel: +44 (0) 020 84179000 
e-mail: f.diab@kingston.ac.uk 
 
Dr Amir Hermidas 
Credit Suisse 
Eleven Madison Avenue 
New York, NY 10010 
United States of America 
Tel: +1 212 325 2000 
e-mail: a_hermidas@hotmail.com 
 
Miss Charikleia Theodoraki 
Kent Business School, University of Kent 
Kent Business School, University of Kent 
Sibson Building, Canterbury, Kent 
CT2 7FS, United Kingdom 
Tel: +44(0) 1227 764000 
e-mail: ct396@kent.ac.uk 
 
Short title: Civil liberties, human capital and FDI 
 
Acknowledgements: We would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their comments 
and suggestions as well as the Area Editor Professor Rajneesh Narula for his guidance 
throughout the review process. 
 
                                                          
1 Corresponding Author 
 
1 
 
Political Governance, Civil Liberties and Human Capital:  
Evaluating their effect on Foreign Direct Investment in Emerging and Developing 
Economies 
 
 
Abstract 
We study the influence of a country’s political governance on its attractiveness to foreign direct 
investors.  We argue that democracy is not a unidimensional concept and that the effect of host country 
political governance on incoming Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) differs depending on whether FDI 
originates from a democratic or an autocratic country. We also hypothesize that the effect of civil 
liberties depends on the motivations of investing Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) and that human 
capital moderates this relationship. We test our hypotheses on a sample of 35,000 investments in 
emerging and developing countries between 2003 and 2013.  
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motivations 
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INTRODUCTION 
With the end of the Cold War in the 1980s, the number of countries pursuing democratic, pro-market 
reforms increased steadily (Levitsky & Way, 2010), but more recently, especially over the last decade, 
there has been a decline in democratic governance (Freedom House, 2017). Regimes, many of them 
autocratic, that held sway in strategic geopolitical locations had long enjoyed the support of the US or 
the USSR as the two main Cold War protagonists (Wright, 2009; Bermeo, 2011). Unsurprising, when 
the forty-five year stalemate finally came to an end there were economic implications for recipient 
countries, and their leaders undertook policies they hoped would ensure stability--and allow them to 
remain in power. One such policy was to proactively attract foreign direct investment (FDI). In this 
paper, we focus on democratic capital, capital that originates from firms based in democratic countries. 
As those firms engage with the governments of host countries, democratisation is promoted (Mosley, 
2017).  
A large stream of studies, predominantly taking an international political economy perspective, 
considers the relationship between democratic capital and the level of democracy in a host location. 
Olson (1993), McGuire and Olson (1996), and Ursprung and Harms (2001) provide evidence that MNEs 
invest more in countries where democratic rights are respected. Rodrik’s (1996, p.57) seminal work 
investigating specifically the relationship between US FDI and host country democratic rights finds that 
countries with weaker democratic rights attract less US capital. The study of Ursprung and Harms 
(2001) also finds a significant positive relationship between democracy and FDI. On the other hand, 
Huntington and Dominguez (1975), Wintrobe (1998), and Greider (1998)  all report a negative 
relationship.  Later studies including Li and Resnick (2003), Adam and Filippaios (2007), and Asiedu 
and Lien (2011) find a non-linear relationship.  
To explain these inconsistencies and provide a more multidimensional definition of democracy, 
another strand of literature focuses on the disaggregated measures that constitute democracy; namely 
political rights and civil liberties. Studies by Huntington and Dominguez (1975), Wintrobe (1998), and 
Greider (1998) provide evidence in support of the idea and show that multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
tend to invest in countries with a low level of civil liberties, that is, where repression is high. Three 
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factors can explain the mixed results. First, most studies tend to focus on the ‘rules of the game’ (North, 
1990) rather than the ‘play of the game’ (Williamson, 1998). Whilst the overall level of democracy and 
quality of institutions (‘rules of the game’) does influence the decisions of MNEs, the interaction 
between an MNE and a host country government (‘play of the game’) is also important. To shed more 
light on the role of the play of the game, we build on the work of Levitsky and Way (2010), adopting 
their approach in order to capture democracy’s multi-dimensional nature, and the varying levels of 
influence individual components of democracy can have on the investment decisions of MNEs. Thus, 
our definition of democracy includes free and fair elections, adult suffrage, protection of civil liberties, 
and few non-elected tutelary authorities (e.g. militaries, monarchies, religious bodies).  
Complimentary to this, we look to the work of Henisz and Mansfield (2006). They see political 
institutions within democracies bounded by the extent to which political decisions are subject to veto 
points, arguing that as the effects of societal forces depend on domestic institutions, so the effects of 
institutions are contingent on societal forces Their findings suggest that democratisation to promote 
prosperity and free trade depends on institutional factors, on global and local macroeconomic 
conditions, and on competition between interest groups.  
Building on the above, we use the term political governance to capture both the rules of the 
game that determine the institutional characteristics of the political regime status but also the play of 
the game that determines the interaction of political parties with other actors in the economy. 
From an International Business (IB) perspective, what motivates MNEs to invest and the role 
civil liberties plays in this choice are crucial. We are interested, thus, in how civil liberties allow MNEs 
to extract additional rents and maximise profits. One would expect civil liberties to influence differently 
investments depending on whether they are market seeking, resource seeking, efficiency seeking or 
strategic asset seeking. Building on the international political economy perspective (Locke, 2016; Lim 
et al., 2015), we argue that civil liberties suppression will have a negative effect on incoming market-
seeking and strategic asset-seeking FDI, but a positive one on resource-seeking and efficiency-seeking 
FDI. Finally, we postulate that the stock of human capital in a host country moderates the relationship 
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between investment motivation and civil liberties, primarily through changes in terms of labour force 
productivity. This is where we make our third conceptual contribution. We build on the work of Mosley 
and Uno (2007) and argue that human capital, especially when semi or highly skilled, can have a 
moderating effect on the relationship between civil liberties suppression and FDI. 
We empirically test our hypotheses on a large sample of approximately 35,000 investment 
projects in 110 developing and emerging economies over the 2003-2013 period. We have collected data 
from thirteen investor home countries, some democratic and some not. This allows us to consider 
country of origin effects and home-host political governance differences. To the best of our knowledge, 
we are the first to use data at the individual investment level. We provide a holistic approach to 
analysing the effect of political governance and civil liberties suppression through the examination of a 
comprehensive number of home and host countries and industries over the ten-year period of the dataset.  
To demonstrate the impact of our interaction effects, we follow an approach suggested by Kingsley et 
al. (2017) and calculate and present the marginal effects, ensuring that we neither overstate nor 
understate our interaction results. 
We structure the remainder of the paper as follows: In Section 2, we present our theoretical 
framework and key arguments and develop our hypotheses. In Section 3, we describe our methodology 
and the key characteristics of our sample, after which in Section 4 we present the results of our 
regressions and discuss them. Finally, in Section 5 we conclude by offering possible future research 
directions. 
THEORETICAL  FRAMEWORK 
In this section, we present our theoretical arguments regarding the role of political governance in 
attracting FDI, the interaction of civil liberties and motivations for FDI, and the moderating effect of 
human capital on that relationship.  
FDI and Political Governance 
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Most studies of the kind we undertake look at different dimensions of democracy. Ursprung and Harms 
(2001) explore the relationship between democracy and incoming FDI to determine if in fact, as some 
have espoused, political repression boosts FDI. They consider 62 developing and transitional economies 
over the 1989-1997 period and find that MNEs tend to be attracted to countries where political and civil 
liberties are respected. Indeed, the extant literature finds a positive relationship between democracy and 
FDI, with few exceptions. One of them is Yang’s (2007) investigation of the relationship between 
political regimes and FDI inflows. He considers two regime types, democracy and autocracy, and three 
measures of FDI, absolute level of FDI inflows, FDI over GDP, and FDI per capita, using a sample of 
134 developing countries over nearly twenty years, 1983 to 2002. He finds no evidence of a systematic 
relationship between democracy and FDI inflows.  
Different approaches have been taken to study the democracy-FDI relationship. Among those 
that focus primarily on the effect the rules of the game have on FDI, Busse (2004) investigates the 
impact of the quality of institutions and the degree of political rights and civil liberties on FDI using 
aggregated and disaggregated measures of democracy, and finds a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between democracy and inward FDI. In a similar vein, Busse and Hefeker (2005), using a 
panel of 83 developing countries over the 1984-2003 period, explore links between institutions, political 
rights and civil liberties, and FDI inflows. They find that “government stability, internal and external 
conflict, corruption and ethnic tensions, law and order, democratic accountability of government, and 
quality of bureaucracy are highly significant determinants of foreign investment inflows” (2005: 5). In 
a recent study, Gossel (2017) finds that FDI is influenced by a country’s past history of democracy, not 
simply its contemporaneous status. At the same time, he finds no relationship between FDI and civil 
liberties. In the same vein, Li et al. (2018) conducted a meta-analysis of the relationship between FDI 
and democracies. Their findings support the idea that democracies tend to attract more FDI. 
Although few, there are studies that examine the play of the game and the way government-
MNE interaction determines investment outcomes. Oneal (1994) argues that autocratic governments 
and MNEs can mutually benefit from collaboration. If a regime grants MNEs access to resources and 
guarantees their profitability in the local market, MNEs may in turn bring new technology and know-
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how to the host country. If economic development results from the exchange, the government will be 
strengthened. Jensen (2003) empirically explores the effect of host country political conditions on FDI 
inflows. He uses both cross section and panel analysis for 114 countries, and finds that democratic 
governments attract higher levels of FDI. He holds that MNEs find democratic countries attractive as 
democratic systems include opposition parties and decisions may be subject to veto, both of which are 
likely to prevent sudden policy changes; thus such countries offer economically and politically stable 
environments. Henisz (2004) argues that economic policy is determined by political struggle within 
institutional frameworks. In democracies, policymaking does not hinge on a single political player, but 
is the result of a bargaining process between actors with diverse objectives. Autocracies are 
characterised instead by few checks and balances. As there is no consultation, there is less volatility in 
policymaking, and this impacts the speed with which policies can be adjusted in response to changes in 
the environment. 
Huntington and Dominguez (1975) initiated a debate in the field by arguing that autocratic 
regimes provide a better economic environment for both domestic and foreign investment as they are 
better positioned to enact efficiency-enhancing policies. This is disputed by Olson (1993) and McGuire 
and Olson (1996), who point to the risk of policy reversals in dictatorships and to the lack of credibility 
of policy stability in countries with weak democratic rights. It is well-established in the literature 
(Ferejohn, 1986; Drazen, 2000) that elections are a disciplining device for policymakers. When 
elections are free and fair, voters will punish officeholders for bad economic outcomes, and knowing 
that, those in office will pursue what they consider to be sound economic policies. Olson (1993) and 
McGuire and Olson (1996), argue that an insecure autocrat has a shorter time horizon as circumstances 
change, thus in countries where political liberties are low, i.e. where electoral mechanisms do not exist 
or do not work efficiently, there will be worse economic outcomes than where citizens have political 
liberties. As less efficient policies have a negative effect on the returns to FDI, FDI falls.  We conclude 
from the seemingly contradictory positions taken in these studies that it is not democracy or autocracy 
per se that influence FDI, but how effective the electoral mechanism is in a host country, or put more 
broadly, how effectively an incumbent government is held  responsible for economic outcomes.  
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Political regimes range from autocracy to full democracy. Levitsky and Way (2010) hold that 
there are many kinds of autocratic governments and under them significant differences in the protection 
of political rights and civil liberties, while in a true democracy both are universally strongly protected. 
They identify an additional type, the Competitive Authoritarian regime which usually guarantees civil 
liberties, while in reality only partially protecting them. This is closely aligned to the argumentation of 
others. Henisz and Mansfield (2004) hold that there is conditionality attached to interest group demands 
and also to institutions in determining the commercial openness of an economy. The extent to which 
domestic institutions filter the effect of interest groups on policy is determined by the degree of 
concentration of governmental authority or by the existence of veto points. Building on this reasoning, 
Henisz and Zelner (2005) argue that there is a clear difference in the complexity of goals between 
foreign investors and governments. Whilst investors focus on the maximisation of returns, policy 
makers must balance the diverse interests of a variety of interest groups and stakeholders. This creates 
volatility in the final outcome of the negotiation process as interest group reactions might influence the 
process. It is arguable that if a spectrum of democratisation exists, with authoritarianism at one end and 
full democracy at the other, competitive authoritarianism would lay between the two (Levitsky & Way, 
2010). As we wrote earlier, Henisz (2004) reasons that economic policy is determined by political 
struggle within an existing institutional framework. Small economies that  depend significantly on 
external capital, be it FDI or developmental aid from Western donors, are subject to a higher degree of 
leverage from MNEs based in democracies (democratic capital). This is demonstrated by the fact that 
the regimes of such countries have the strongest links to Western democracies. Often a key reason for 
attempting to strengthen ties is to avoid isolation by Western governments (Levitsky & Way, 2010). 
The actions of opposition political parties or the existence of veto points may lead to a change in policy 
(Henisz, 2004). Based on the above, we argue that countries with democratic political environments 
will attract greater FDI inflows, whereas those which are overtly autocratic, will attract less. We further 
postulate that politically transparent and democratic countries are more likely to be attractive to MNEs 
themselves from democratic countries. Those MNEs understand not only the rules of the game but also 
the play of the game in democratic environments where there are more checks and balances. On this 
basis, we formulate our first hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1a: An autocratic regime in a country reduces the amount of FDI from democratic           
countries.  
 
Conversely, autocratic countries such as China are more likely to direct FDI to other autocratic 
countries, either for ideological reasons or strategic motives (Buckley et al., 2007). This is especially 
true in the case of emerging and developing countries. We assume that this is related primarily to the 
heterogeneity of host countries and not to the limited political idiosyncrasies of home countries. 
However, Chinese FDI has a different pattern, with Chinese firms acquiring targets in developed 
economies. Clegg et al. (2018) investigate the relationship between home country autocracy and the 
internationalisation of state-owned MNEs and find that such MNEs can become an autocratic 
government’s instrument to get access to resources and to advance a mercantilist agenda. Because many 
Chinese MNEs are state owned, this accounts for a significant share of Chinese outward FDI. Narula 
(2012) argues that location assets and their availability are affected by the way governments restrict or 
encourage particular activities. Commercial and strategic considerations, in addition to serving the 
interests of specific groups, are the key reasons for this type of government intervention. Consequently, 
we argue that the relationship between an autocratic regime and inward FDI from other autocratic 
countries will differ from the one postulated in Hypothesis 1a. We therefore hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 1b: An autocratic regime in a country increases the amount of FDI from other 
autocratic countries. 
 
FDI and Civil Liberties – The Role of FDI Motives 
The way MNEs interact with local governments is one factor that influences FDI. They interact as well 
with a variety of social actors--including trade unions. Such interaction determines the ability of an 
MNE to maximise profits and extract rents. A number of papers have considered the influence of non-
government institutions on FDI with results supporting a range of outcomes. Pournarakis and Varsakelis 
(2004) investigate the factors leading to uneven allocation of FDI in economies in transition. They look 
at the 1997-2001 period, and find that higher levels of civil rights combined with better quality 
institutions have an indirect positive effect on FDI.  Blanton and Blanton (2007) examine the impact of 
human rights on FDI inflows and empirically show that those rights have both direct and indirect effects, 
9 
 
with repression negatively related to FDI inflows. They also find human rights significantly positively 
related to human capital, and that human rights have a significant indirect effect upon FDI through their 
impact on human capital. Finally, they do not find a significant relationship between democracy and 
democratic institutions and FDI inflows. According to Mosley (2017), improvement in workers’ rights 
is only possible if there is clear alignment between MNE intentions to improve procedural rights and 
working conditions, and governmental incentives. Mosley (2011) shows in previous work that the 
presence of MNEs usually strengthens the protection of labour rights, a key component of civil liberties. 
MNEs originate from both developed and developing economies, thus the labour standards and 
institutional environment of their home country may differ from those prevailing in host countries 
(Pandya, 2016). The crucial actor is a host government willing to enforce strict labour standards 
regardless of the risk that FDI may be lost to countries with lower labour standards (Mosley, 2017). It 
is arguable that greater alignment of interests between MNEs and governments exists in industries 
where the demand for workers or specific skills exceeds local supply. FDI can have a positive impact 
on workers’ rights when it is contingent on a government improving them. Industry specifics can also 
influence labour rights as Locke (2016) shows in looking at the athletics footwear sector. He 
demonstrates how in a fast paced, efficiency-seeking industry, the incentive to relax working standards 
and in general suppress the rights of workers is quite high. 
The body of work we have highlighted shows that civil liberties can influence FDI in different 
ways. When FDI is market seeking or strategic asset seeking it is not likely to flow to economies where 
civil liberties are supressed, whereas FDI which is resource seeking or efficiency seeking will be 
attracted to such economies to capture cost reductions and efficiency gains. We expect differences in 
the impact on FDI inflows of civil liberties between market-seeking and strategic asset-seeking 
investment on one hand, and resource-seeking and efficiency-seeking investment on the other. 
Cuervo-Cazurra and Narula (2015) argue that changes in the behaviour of MNEs that have 
taken place over the last 30 years have led to a rethink of the internationalisation motives proposed by 
Dunning (1993). There is now increased emphasis on strategic assets both by investing firms and by 
host governments. Whilst it is arguable that strategic asset-seeking investment can have significant 
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positive externalities and therefore welfare effects, this does not mean that countries should concentrate 
on attracting such investments to the exclusion of others. Giroud and Mirza (2015) underscore this in 
arguing that the economic structure of a country determines the investment motives of potential 
investing MNEs. The business activities of a firm determine whether it will have market-seeking, 
resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking or strategic asset-seeking motives. We identify what kinds of 
activities correspond to each of the four investment motives (see Table 6). Following Cuervo-Cazurra 
et al. (2015) we combine arguments on the choice between economics-driven exploitation of resources 
or exploration of new ones, and on the psychology-driven set of pull and push factors that impact the 
search for better country conditions.  
Strategic asset-seeking firms internationalise in pursuit of foreign assets they need for the 
medium and long-term regeneration of their competitive scope. This type of investment is motivated by 
the increased geographical dispersion of the key inputs to an MNE’s creative and learning processes. 
In developing and emerging markets, strategic asset seeking is motivated by the need to tap the host 
country’s system of innovation in order to develop locally-adapted products. To achieve its strategic 
asset-seeking goal an MNE needs to have access to well-educated, highly-skilled and innovative 
workers and workers having such attributes are found, or can be developed, where civil liberties are 
strongly protected. Thus we hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 2a: Civil liberties suppression will have a negative effect on strategic asset- seeking 
FDI. 
An MNE having a market-seeking motivation intends to produce in a host country goods or 
services for consumption either in that country or in the region. Two distinct factors determine the 
suitability of a location for an MNE having a market-seeking motivation. First, there needs to be a fit 
between the firm’s competitive environment and the target market, i.e. there must be reason to believe 
an investment will be profitable. Second, local production must be preferable to exports for serving the 
market. One important consideration here is the need for local responsiveness: the MNE needs a local 
presence to adapt its products and processes to local tastes and market conditions (e.g. regulations). 
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Market-serving MNEs are likely to be keen to have high labour standards because of reputational 
benefits. We thus hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2b: Civil liberties suppression will have a negative effect on market-seeking FDI. 
In contrast to market-seeking investments, efficiency-seeking ones entail the relocation of 
production abroad to achieve cost competitiveness in the MNE’s mature high-income home market. 
The main driver is cost reduction and that can be achieved by maximisation of rents extracted from 
local operations. Civil liberties suppression, including reducing or doing away with bargaining rights, 
saps the power of trade unions, to the advantage of MNEs (Cuervo-Cazurra et al. 2015). Hence: 
Hypothesis 2c: Civil liberties suppression will have a positive effect on efficiency-seeking FDI.  
Finally, firms with resource-seeking motives are usually interested in obtaining natural 
resources at lower cost than in their home country. In many instances, especially when the resources 
are scarce in their home country, they will be looking for a long-term guaranteed supply.  Witte et al 
(2017) look at the effect of political conflict on FDI. They distinguish between resource and non-
resource sectors and conclude that FDI in resource-based sectors is less sensitive to political conflict, 
irrespective of its nature, because of the high profitability of the investment. A second resource-seeking 
motivation is accessing an abundant labour force to remain cost competitive.  In both cases, the MNE 
motivation is cost reduction and therefore we hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 2d: Civil liberties suppression will have a positive effect on resource-seeking FDI. 
The Moderating Effect of Human Capital 
Globalisation impacts labour rights in at least two ways. FDI may contribute to a climb to the top in 
which case governments are pressured to improve labour standards, alternatively MNE competition 
may have a negative effect, a labour-standard race to the bottom (Mosley & Uno, 2007). There are three 
avenues open to MNEs to improve workers’ rights: (i) applying direct pressure on local governments, 
(ii) implementing best practices, and (iii) focusing on the quality of labour over its cost. Borensztein et 
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al. (1998) suggest that FDI has a stronger impact on host country growth when the country has a 
minimum level of human capital. 
Productivity is a key consideration in making FDI decisions and a host country’s level of human 
resources clearly correlates with FDI inflows. Dunning (1988) tested the influence of skills and 
educational level on FDI inflows and found that both have a significant impact.  Noorbakhsh et al. 
(2001) go a step further seeing human capital as one of the most important determinants of FDI inflows. 
We assume, in this paper, that significant civil liberties suppression has a negative effect on worker 
productivity as in such an environment workers do not take the initiative, do not cooperate effectively, 
and have less incentive to be productive. These weaknesses mean lower returns to foreign investment. 
An increase in civil liberties, including economic rights, may stimulate the working of the market, and 
so lead to better productivity and growth (Friedman, 1962). As the level of civil liberties rise, the 
productivity of the workforce increases, but it must be acknowledged that at the same time there may 
be adverse consequences. Labour unions and special interest groups are likely to form and as they gain 
power their ability to extract rents from MNEs will increase. As a number of empirical studies have 
shown, the effect of a change in civil liberties on FDI is similar to the non-linear relationship between 
civil liberties and growth (see Przeworski & Limongi, 1993 and Barro, 1997). We argue that the effects 
are contingent on the investment motive of the MNE, but will be moderated by the quality of the labour 
force in the host country. For instance, Kuncera and Principi (2017) evaluate the impact on FDI of 
political rights and a country’s governance and find that for market-seeking industries with highly-
skilled labour force requirements the effect of rights on FDI is positive. Thus, a highly-skilled labour 
force will positively moderate the effect of civil liberties suppression on FDI inflows in the case of 
market-seeking and strategic asset-seeking investments. On the other hand, an unskilled or semi-skilled 
labour force will enable efficiency-seeking and resource-seeking MNEs to maximize their bargaining 
power, and this will reduce the positive impact of civil liberties suppression on FDI. On this basis, we 
formulate our third hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3a: A high level of human capital in the host country will positively moderate the 
relationship between civil liberties suppression and FDI inflows for market-seeking and 
strategic asset-seeking FDI. 
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Hypothesis 3b: A high level of human capital will negatively moderate the relationship 
between civil liberties suppression and FDI inflows for resource-seeking and efficiency-seeking 
FDI. 
 
  METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
We adopt a quantitative approach to test our hypotheses. The database we use, FDI Markets, is unique 
in that it covers foreign direct investments across a wide array of developing and emerging countries. 
Despite its shortcomings, it is gaining traction among researchers. As far as we know, none of the 
published papers that have used this database have collected such an extensive sample. We collected 
data on greenfield investments globally from 2003 onwards. The database provides information on the 
number of jobs created by each investment.  One limitation is that when information is not available 
from the firm, an algorithm is used to calculate an estimated value for the investment and jobs created.1 
To overcome this shortcoming, we have selected  jobs created as a dependent variable as there are much 
fewer estimated values for jobs created than for investment value.2  Apart from the obvious desirability 
of better data, we opt to measure jobs created for two reasons. First, jobs created are more sensitive than 
investment value to  political rights and civil liberties (Mosley & Uno, 2007). Most of the arguments 
we have developed relate to the ability of an MNE to extract rents from the labour force, thus we would 
expect a stronger impact on jobs created than on capital invested. Second, a number of studies prior to 
this one have convincingly used jobs created to investigate the effect on FDI of political rights and civil 
liberties.3 As sensitivity analysis, we have performed our regressions based on projects with actual 
values and the results are robust.4  
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To test our first set of hypotheses, we selected thirteen MNE home countries from which 
investments were made in developed, developing and emerging markets having different regime types 
(see Table 1). There are 110 host countries across four continents.5 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
The projects included in our analysis were undertaken between January 2003 and December 
2013 during which time more than 12 million jobs were created in the host countries. By far the investor 
country with the highest number of projects is the US, nearly a third of the total, followed by Germany, 
Japan, UK and France. The  average number of jobs created per project is 228, and the average capital 
invested per project 69.4 million USD.  South Korea and China undertook fewer projects than the top 
five countries listed above, but outstripped them all by a considerable amount in terms of the average 
number of jobs created per project. China tops the list in capital invested per project.  
Independent Variables 
Our main independent variables capturing political governance and civil liberties suppression come 
from two separate databases: the first from Polity IV6 and the second from Freedom House. The variable 
used in our analysis, political governance (as measured by Polity IV), is a composite variable that takes 
a value from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 (democracy). Polity IV does not measure the level of civil 
liberties. We therefore measure civil liberties suppression separately, using data from the 2017 annual 
Freedom in the World report of Freedom House. Freedom House is a US-based not for profit NGO 
which since 1972 has rated all countries according to their democratic institutions. Two indices are 
reported, one measuring political rights and the other civil liberties. Each index has a scale of 1 to 7, 1 
for  full political rights and civil liberties and 7 for their total absence.7 To complement the two we also 
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measure institutional quality through a composite measure based on data from the International Country 
Risk Guide. The political risk components we included were government stability, socioeconomic 
conditions, investment profile, the frequency of internal and external conflict, corruption, the role of the 
military and religion in politics, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability and 
bureaucratic quality. Low values indicate lower institutional quality and thus higher risk to potential 
investors. A possible limitation of this approach is that we do not capture the effect of individual 
institutional factors on FDI. We combined these different measures because there is a high level of 
correlation between them and because we want to keep the focus on the effect of political regime status 
and civil liberties.  
We averaged (over the 2003-2013 period) the political rights, civil liberties and institutional 
quality scores of the host countries in which MNEs invested. Those averages are shown by MNE home 
country in Table 2. The data reported in the political governence column shows that MNEs based in the 
UAE, India, Japan and South Korea tend to invest in countries with autocratic regimes. In the case of 
the UAE this is perhaps not surprising as it is itself an autocratic regime, but it is unexpected in the case 
of MNEs based in the other three countries. Levitsky and Way (2010) call them, ‘dark knights’. MNEs 
based in Germany (4.17) and Spain (4.55) invest in more democratic regimes. After those two countries, 
it is China (3.51) that invests most in countries with high political governance scores. This may be 
explained by strategic asset-seeking investments in democratic countries. 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
To measure the level of human capital in host economies we have used gross enrolment in 
secondary and tertiary education.8 The share of youth in secondary education captures the availability 
of a semi-skilled labour force, whilst that for tertiary education captures a highly-skilled one. We could 
have used a human development index or the proportion of those in the labour force who already have 
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secondary and tertiary educations. We did not select those indicators as they overlap with two of our 
other variables: labour cost, and the proportion of the labour force having different levels of education. 
We present some basic statistics for these key variables in Table 3.  
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
Between 2003 and 2013, we see some progress in civil liberties, and even more in political 
governance, but in contrast to that positive picture, there was deterioration in the level of institutional 
quality. It is significant however that there was improvement in the skills of the population in host 
countries as reflected in gross enrolment in secondary education increasing roughly from 74% to 93%, 
and in tertiary education from 32% to 42%. These figures show that the most improvement took place 
in the semi-skilled segment of the workforce. During the same period, the average size of projects 
declined both in terms of jobs created and capital invested even though there was a significant increase 
in the number of projects. 
Control Variables 
As control variables, we include  country economic size (GDP), labour cost of production (GDP per 
person employed), FDI inflows, and trade openness (Trade). We also include ores and metals exports 
as well as fuel exports in order to capture a country’s endowment of natural resources and therefore its 
attractiveness to resource-seeking FDI. We summarise in Table 4 key variables and data sources. 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
The summary statistics of our dependent and independent variables can be seen in Table 5 
whilst we provide a correlation table in Appendix 2. 
 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
17 
 
Despite the high number of observations for our dependent variables, data limitations, in 
particular for host country human capital, resulted in a significantly smaller usable sample.   
 
Classification of Activities by Investment Motivation 
An important contribution of this study is that we are able to clearly distinguish between the motivations 
for FDI. FDI Markets provides information on industries, business activities and, for a number of 
investments, their key motives. We did not proxy these motives by the industry classification of the 
investment, since investment motives may differ within a single industry. For example, a number of oil 
and natural gas extraction investments are classified by the database as retail, i.e. their primary goal was 
servicing the local market. It would have been incorrect to have classified their motivation as resource 
seeking. We have used the additional information provided by FDI Markets about specific motives 
indicated by certain business activities, and cross-examined this with industry information to form a 
basis for linking investment information on business activities with MNEs’ motivations9. We present 
those classifications in Table 6.10 
 
Insert Table 6 here 
 
Estimation Method 
Our sample consists of individual investments across multiple countries over a number of years. As 
such, it is not a panel dataset and therefore applying panel data estimation methods would be 
inappropriate. We decided to use a pooled OLS estimation with year and industry effects. The R-square 
and the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) as well as the correlation table do not indicate any 
multicollinearity problems for our estimations. We also report the F-statistic associated with the time 
and industry effects. Finally, we have used White-corrected standard errors to control for 
heteroscedasticity. We log-transformed the number of jobs created (our dependent variable) and host 
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country GDP. We did not standardise our interaction effects in order to allow for better interpretation 
of the marginal effects.11 To look for  interaction effects we follow the approach proposed by Kingsley 
et al. (2017).  Most studies report only the size and significance of the interaction coefficient. This could 
lead, according to the authors, to an overstating or understating of the interaction effect. It is therefore 
important to investigate the marginal effect and its value across the range of the moderating variable. 
Examining the marginal effect, especially through a graphical representation, can show whether there 
are values of the moderating variable which have a statistically significant effect, in spite of the overall 
coefficient being insignificant, or inversely, whether there are values for the moderating variable where 
the effect is insignificant despite the fact that the interaction coefficient is statistically significant. We 
calculate the marginal effects of civil liberties when entering our two moderating variables, gross 
enrolment in secondary and in tertiary education. We compare the two levels of human capital for each 
of the FDI motivations. This enables us to have a very specific picture of the moderating effect and 
therefore avoid understating or overstating the interaction results. 
 
 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
FDI and Political Governance 
We use our first set of regressions to investigate the impact of democratic capital on FDI, and present 
in Table 7 the determinants of FDI from democratic and autocratic home countries. We also present 
robustness checks excluding Russia 12  from the sample of democratic countries (as an investor), 
including it instead as an autocratic host country (Models 5 and 6). We do something similar in the case 
of China, excluding it from the sample as an investment destination (host country) (Model 3). We also 
look at Chinese investments separately (Model 7). All model specifications in Table 7 show VIF values 
to be within an acceptable range, and include time and industry effects, when they are statistically 
significant. Our first models (1-3) in Table 7 present the individual effects of political governance, civil 
liberties suppression, institutional quality, and human capital on jobs created by each FDI project. In 
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Model 1, all investing countries (including Russia and China)  are classified as democratic  (using Polity 
IV data). 
 
Insert Table 7 here 
 
When running on all democratic countries, the size of the host economy (GDP) has, as expected, 
a positive and statistically significant impact on jobs created, whilst the cost of labour (GDP per person 
employed) has a negative and statistically significant one. This indicates the existence of a competition 
effect which acts as a deterrent to FDI. Both measures of human capital, gross enrolment in secondary 
and in tertiary education, have negative and significant coefficients, indicating that the cost of labour 
and the existence of semi-skilled or highly-skilled workers negatively influences the number of jobs 
created per project. Our results also indicate that the institutional quality of the host country has a 
positive and statistically significant impacts on inward FDI.  Political governance has a strong positive 
effect in all specifications, indicating that FDI from democratic countries is positively and statistically 
significantly influenced by the existence of a democratic regime in the host country13. This result is in 
line with the extant literature and confirms H1a. It provides evidence of the existence of democratic 
capital. Similarly, civil liberties suppression has a negative and statistically significant impact, 
indicating that countries where they are suppressed attract less FDI, as measured by jobs created per 
project. These results allow us to make an important contribution to the debate on the impact of 
democracy on FDI be it through rules of the game or play of the game.  
 
Results for autocratic countries (as investors) are presented in models 4-7. Market size, 
measured by GDP, and labour cost, measured by GDP per person employed, appear to be the most 
significant factors, with the exception of Chinese investments (Model 7) where GDP loses significance. 
These findings indicate strong market-seeking and efficiency-seeking motives by Chinese, Emirati, and 
Russian MNEs. The effect of political governance remains positive and statistically significant, with 
                                                          
 
20 
 
the exception of the model for China (Model 7). We do not find overall support for our hypothesis H1b, 
according to which autocratic regimes tend to invest more in other autocratic regimes. On the other 
hand, institutional quality and civil liberties suppression lose significance. It appears that autocratic 
country MNEs tend to invest where the rules of the game are weak but the play of the game, through 
transparency in political governance, strong. This too is in line with the extant literature. In conclusion, 
we find support for H1a but not H1b, political governance appears to impact FDI, but the effect of 
democracy on FDI is stronger than that of autocracy. 
 
FDI and Civil Liberties – The Role of FDI Motives 
Our finding of a strong negative effect of civil liberties suppression on FDI from democratic countries 
led us to explore the relationship further. We have argued that there is a positive relationship between 
civil liberties suppression and resource-seeking and efficiency-seeking investments (H2a and H2b), but 
that the relationship is negative in the case of market-seeking and strategic asset-seeking ones (H2c and 
H2d). To be able to compare results with those of the previous runs, we run separately for democratic 
and autocratic investing countries  We present our results for democratic countries in Table 8 (Models 
8 -15) and for autocratic countries in Table 9 (Models 16-23). We see China as a special case so present 
those results in Appendix 4 (Models 24-27).  
 
Insert Tables 8 and 9 here 
 
We found some support for the notion that in the case of democratic countries a large market 
size (GDP) attracts FDI if the motivation is market seeking, strategic asset seeking or efficiency seeking. 
High cost of labour (GDP per person employed) deters FDI if motivated by anything other than strategic 
asset seeking, the sole motivation for which there is a statistically significant positive effect. This is 
possibly due to a desire to access high skills. Institutional quality does not have a significant effect 
except when motivated by strategic asset seeking (models 8-10). We also observe a differential effect 
in the case of political governance, positive and significant only for resource-seeking and market-
seeking FDI. Civil liberties suppression remains negative and statistically significant for resource-
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seeking and strategic asset-seeking FDI. Thus we find in the case of democratic countries strong support 
for H2a and H2d but no support for H2b or H2c. It appears then that the effect of civil liberties is 
contingent on FDI motives--but not for all of them. The results differ in the case of autocratic countries 
(Models 16-19). Unsurprisingly, resource-seeking MNEs tend to be attracted by the availability of ores 
and metals. They are also attracted by autocratic regimes. This is in line with Oneal (1994) who holds 
that when an autocratic government can guarantee access to resources, both the investing MNE and the 
regime can benefit. Efficiency-seeking MNEs are attracted by large markets with low labour costs and 
a high level of natural resources, while market-seeking MNEs are attracted to large markets with low 
labour costs. Strategic asset-seeking MNEs do not demonstrate any particular  preferences. The 
estimated effects of civil liberties suppression are all in line with our hypotheses, i.e. positive for 
resource-seeking and efficiency-seeking MNEs and negative for market-seeking and strategic asset-
seeking MNEs, but fail to reach acceptable levels of significance. We cannot, therefore, find support 
for our H2a to H2d hypotheses for MNEs in autocratic home countries. 
 
The Moderating Role of Human Capital  
In the final step of our empirical analysis we look at the moderating effect of human capital (gross 
enrolment in secondary and in tertiary education) on the impact of civil liberties suppression on FDI. 
Our results are presented in Tables 8 (models 12-15) and 9 (models 20-23)14. Following Kingsley et al. 
(2017), we graphically present the marginal effects of the interactions. We do not focus on the 
interaction coefficients, as the marginal effects offer a better interpretation. Figures 1 through 8 show 
the effect of secondary and of tertiary education on FDI contingent on the level of civil liberties 
suppression (low on the left of the figure and high on the right). A statistically significant effect is 
represented in each figure by a solid line. We present four democratic home country-autocratic home 
country pairs, each illustrating a different FDI motivation, thus Figures 1, 3, 5 and 7 show democratic 
country estimations and Figures 2, 4, 6 and 8 autocratic country ones. We have hypothesised that when 
FDI is resource seeking or efficiency seeking, high levels of human capital will decrease the positive 
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effect of civil liberties suppression on FDI, whilst when FDI is market seeking or strategic asset seeking 
high levels of human capital will boost the negative effect of civil liberties suppression on FDI. Figures 
1 and 2 illustrate the marginal effect of secondary and of tertiary education and civil liberties 
suppression on FDI when it is strategic asset seeking. There is strong support for H3a for strategic asset-
seeking FDI from democratic countries. The negative effect of high civil liberties suppression is 
especially clear in the case of tertiary education. The strong effect reflects the need for a highly-killed, 
productive and innovative labour force for strategic asset-seeking investments from democratic 
countries. The effect for autocratic countries is not statistically significant. 
 
Insert Figures 1 and 2 here 
 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the effect in the case of market-seeking FDI. There is a strong negative 
effect for both secondary and for tertiary education especially when there is a high level of civil liberties 
suppression, suggesting that not only are there productivity implications but also significant reputational 
effects for MNEs. This supports further H3a when FDI originates in democratic countries. This effect 
also exists for tertiary education in the case of market-seeking FDI from autocratic countries, but does 
not for secondary education.  
 
Insert Figures 3 and 4 here 
 
Figures 5 and 6 show the effect in the case of resource-seeking FDI. There are mixed results 
when the investment originates in democratic countries. Whilst the relationship for tertiary education 
remains overall negative, there is a diminishing effect the higher the level of civil liberties suppression, 
thus supporting H3b for democratic countries. There is no statistically significant effect for tertiary 
education in the case of FDI from autocratic countries. 
 
Insert Figures 5 and 6 here 
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Finally, Figures 7 and 8 represent the relationship in the case of efficiency-seeking FDI. There 
is no statistically significant effect for FDI from democratic countries, but there is a strong positive 
effect for tertiary education as the level of civil liberties suppression increases when the investment 
comes from autocratic countries. There is no support for H3b, but this is not surprising as the effect 
suggests that MNEs from autocratic countries would prefer having the civil liberties of a highly-skilled 
labour force suppressed when they invest in other developing and emerging markets as it would give 
them the opportunity to extract additional rents from efficiency-seeking investment. Nonetheless, the 
fact remains that there is no support for H3b for investment originating in autocratic countries. 
 
Insert Figures 7 and 8 here 
 
                              CONCLUSIONS AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
An important contribution of our study lies in bringing closer the international business and the business 
and human rights literatures. We develop a holistic view of the impact of host country political 
governance and civil liberties on FDI inflows. We do so in response to the Wettstein et al. (2019) call. 
They suggest a research agenda that would enable IB scholars to address in a new way the impact of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices on economic development and sustainability, a 
relationship with significant implications for the behaviour of MNEs. For instance, Tashman et al. 
(2018) find that institutional voids in the home countries of emerging market MNEs allow them to 
decouple CSR claims from their actual implementation. 
We have been able to provide useful insights on the way institutions interact with MNEs in a 
number of contexts. Our approach also responds to Aguilera and Grøgaard (2018) who argue that in IB 
research there is a clear need to disentangle the role of institutions in order to understand their impact 
on firms. Different studies use the term ‘institutions’ in different ways resulting in too many constructs 
and ideas being captured. An approach, therefore, that takes into consideration the multi-faceted nature 
of institutions would advance the IB literature.  Jackson and Deeg (2019) suggest that institutions have 
not only direct influence on firm behaviour but a moderating one as well on a number of relationships. 
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We argue that MNEs interacting with local governments and social actors such as trade unions, are 
influenced not only by the rules but also the play of the game (Williamson, 1998). This could have 
implications for investment decisions, but most of the extant literature focuses on just the rules. We 
argue that similarity in political governance helps MNEs negotiate with host governments. Thus we 
hypothesise a different effect when FDI originates from democratic countries than when it originates 
from autocratic ones. In the same vein, we theorise that there will be differences in the way civil liberties 
will impact FDI. Those differences arise from various investment motives. Finally, the relationship 
between human rights and FDI is moderated by the level of human capital, specifically the level of 
workforce skills.  We focus on emerging and developing economies so as to provide evidence on the 
differential behaviour of MNEs originating from these countries. The results of our empirical analysis 
provide overall support for our theoretical argumentation. They are also in line with the findings of 
Asiedu and Lien (2011), Adam and Filippaios (2007), and Li and Resnick (2003).  . 
We find in addition that autocratic regimes discourage FDI, which supports our first hypothesis 
and is in line with the findings of Jensen (2003), Addison and Heshmati (2003), Sethi et al. (2003) , and 
Adam and Filippaios (2007). We conclude that it is important for MNEs based in democratic countries 
to invest in developing and emerging markets that are committed to the protection of political rights, as 
investing in those that do not can have a detrimental effect on their reputation. 
 
Our study has also clear policy implications for host countries. Although we do not directly 
address the issue of economic development and sustainability, we are able to offer useful insights into 
the ways host countries can maximise the benefits of inward FDI. Narula and Dunning (2010) argue 
that the quantity and quality of FDI and its motivation matter for the economic development of a host 
country. Host country governments need to take a proactive approach to attract the type of  FDI that 
will maximize benefits. We evaluate the role of human capital, which requires continuous investment 
in education. What we find is in line with Narula’s (2018) argument that only host countries that 
maintain investment in their location advantages are able to secure benefits from MNEs. We provide 
insights on the ways host country governments can maximise benefits and minimize costs of FDI. 
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Narula and Pineli (2018) show that MNE operations can have both positive and adverse effects on the 
economic development of host countries.  They argue that a full understanding of the impact of MNE 
activities on economic development requires taking a global value chain perspective. Similarly, Awad 
and Ragab (2017) investigate the nexus between democracy and FDI in Africa in a dynamic way. They 
find that FDI has a positive effect on economic growth that is reduced by past experience with 
democracy, not the current level of democracy. They conclude that as the impact of FDI on growth 
decreases as a country becomes more democratic, more sustainable activities must be found.  
Our study has a number of limitations. Although we have controlled for industry-effects, further 
work on the differential effect of political rights and civil liberties suppression on specific industries is 
warranted. Our study, although it captures investment motives, does not address this dimension as we 
aim to provide a more general perspective. We also do not provide a detailed examination of host 
countries. It would be interesting to look at FDI in African countries and to explore further the impact 
of political governance and civil liberties within them, especially in the case of those that are resource-
rich. We do not offer a detailed examination of all the institutional factors that influence FDI decisions, 
focusing instead on political governance and civil liberties.  
 
Future research on the effect of civil liberties on FDI might use more detailed measures. Wong 
(2016) provides evidence that democracies fail to reduce inequality, but argues that those with well-
established economic institutions and property protection laws in place are attractive to foreign 
investors. FDI tends to create a pool of well-paid workers, although they usually are a small proportion 
of the general population. Thus, while we would expect a reduction in inequality in developing and 
emerging countries experiencing high FDI inflows, actually FDI is likely to increase income inequality. 
 
Finally, we have controlled for the effects of time and industry, but a closer examination of the 
manner in which firms from various countries invest abroad would, we believe, shed further light on a 
home country effect.  
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                                                               NOTES 
 
     1 Further information on the algorithm used can be obtained from the authors upon request.      
       2 We run our regression on a sample excluding inputed values and the results were unchanged. 
They are available from the authors. 
      3 Paniagua and Sapena (2014) use jobs created to investigate the influence of democratic rights on 
FDI. Wren and Jones (2010) investigate the impact of regional grants on jobs created. They see jobs 
created as having a stronger influence on policy than investment value. 
      4 These results are available from the authors upon request. 
      5 The list of recipient countries can be found in Appendix 1. 
         6 Given the complementarity between Polity (2007) and Henisz (2000a, b) Political Constraint 
Index we have also used the latter as an alternative measure of polity. The two variables have a 
significant correlation close to 0.74 and results remain almost identical. These alternative estimations 
can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
       7 Civil liberties index and Polity have high correlation coefficient. To avoid issues with 
multicollinearity we have orthogonalised the civil liberties index on Polity for the respective 
regressions. The estimations used to transform the variable can be found in Appendix 3. 
         8 Secondary and Tertiary Education Gross Enrolments have high correlation coefficient. To 
avoid issues with multicollinearity and to only pick up the effect of highly-skilled labour force in our 
regressions we have orthogonalised the two variables. The estimations used to transform the variable 
can be found in Appendix 3. 
       9 A significant number of activities are classified as manufacturing. We have classified the high-
technology activities of manufacturing as strategic asset-seeking. An alternative classification was used 
with all manufacturing activities classified as efficiency seeking but this did not significantly change 
the results. 
      10 A more detailed table containing the industry information can be obtained from the authors upon 
request.  
      11 We also ran the models with standardized values as a robustness check. All variables were 
standardized with a mean of zero (0) and a standard deviation of one (1). These results can be 
obtained from the authors upon request. 
      12 Russia has a mean of 4.77 (over the 2003-2013 period) for its Polity score and therefore is 
closer to a democracy than an autocracy. 
         13 The results are identical when we use the Political Constraint Index of Henisz (2000a, b) and 
these are  available from the authors upon request. 
          14  The same set of results with China excluded as host market and with the interaction effects 
based on standardised variables have been estimated as robustness checks. 
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Table 1. FDI projects included in the analysis 
Home Country Number of Projects Total Jobs 
 Created 
Average Jobs  
per project 
Total Capital Invested 
(Mil US$) 
Average Capital invested  
per project (Mil US$) 
Canada 1,565.00 403,573.00 257.87 203,314.05 129.91 
China 1,057.00 411,229.00 389.05 148,865.26 140.84 
France 4,393.00 980,429.00 223.18 300,924.13 68.50 
Germany 7,273.00 1,567,548.00 215.53 393,281.01 54.07 
India 1,674.00 321,881.00 192.28 125,453.74 74.94 
Italy 2,091.00 460,448.00 220.20 145,737.95 69.70 
Japan 6,345.00 1,710,261.00 269.54 421,610.11 66.45 
Russia 964.00 195,570.00 202.87 97,364.21 101.00 
South Korea 1,558.00 647,072.00 415.32 182,280.94 117.00 
Spain 2,734.00 578,749.00 211.69 170,458.47 62.35 
UAE 1,438.00 382,398.00 265.92 191,550.36 133.21 
UK 5,975.00 1,1048,19.00 184.91 366,500.50 61.34 
United States 16,694.00 3,527,618.00 211.31 983,760.59 58.93 
Grand Total 53,761.00 12,291,595.00 228.63 3,731,101.29 69.40 
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Table 2. Average political governance, civil liberties and institutional quality of host locations (by investing country) 
Home Country Political 
governance 
(Average of host 
locations) 
Civil Liberties 
Suppression 
(Average of host 
locations) 
Institutional Quality 
(Average of host 
locations) 
Canada 2.39 3.66 67.31 
China 3.51 3.64 65.41 
France 1.85 3.75 68.12 
Germany 4.17 3.28 69.11 
India -0.69 4.28 68.59 
Italy 3.03 3.55 68.22 
Japan 0.71 4.28 66.83 
Russia 2.16 3.62 66.77 
South Korea 0.32 4.29 66.57 
Spain 4.55 3.16 67.96 
UAE -3.21 4.60 64.43 
UK 1.93 3.73 68.88 
United States 2.37 3.79 68.31 
Grand Total 2.18 3.77 68.01 
 
Table 3.  Average political governance, civil liberties, gross enrolment in education, jobs created, labour force and 
capital invested between 2003 and 2013  
 2003 2013 Overall Average 
Political governance 1.93 2.59 2.18 
Civil Liberties Suppression 3.98 3.77 3.76 
Institutional Quality 68.91 65.08 68.01 
Secondary enrolment 74.45 93.60 80.84 
Tertiary enrolment 31.50 41.95 36.48 
Jobs created 266 183 228 
Capital invested 85.59 55.79 69.40 
Projects 4140 5900  
 
  
34 
 
Table 4. Definitions and sources of variables 
Variable Definition Source Transformation 
Jobs created Jobs created by project FDI Markets Logarithmic 
GDP GDP, PPP (constant 2011 
international $) 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
Logarithmic 
GDP per person employed GDP per person employed (constant 
1990 PPP $) 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
None 
FDI Inflows Foreign direct investment, net inflows 
(% of GDP) 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
None 
Trade Trade (% of GDP) World 
Development 
Indicators 
None 
Ores and metals exports Ores and metals exports (% of 
merchandise exports) 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
None 
Fuel exports Fuel exports (% of merchandise 
exports) 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
None 
Gross enrolment ratio, secondary Gross enrolment ratio, secondary, 
both sexes (%)  
World 
Development 
Indicators 
None 
Gross enrolment ratio, tertiary Gross enrolment ratio, tertiary, both 
sexes (%) 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
Orthogonal on 
Gross enrolment 
ratio, secondary 
Institutional quality Composite measure of institutional 
quality that includes: Government 
Stability, Socioeconomic Conditions, 
Investment profile, Internal and 
External Conflict, Corruption, 
Military and Religion in Politics, law 
and Order, Ethnic Tensions, 
Democratic Accountability and 
Bureaucratic Quality 
Takes values 0-100 with lower values 
indicating lower institutional quality 
International 
Country Risk 
Guide 
None 
Political Governance Composite index capturing the 
position of a country along the 
spectrum of autocratic and democratic 
regimes. Takes values -10 (strongly 
autocratic) to 10 (strongly 
democratic). 
Polity IV 
Project 
None 
Civil liberties suppression Composite index capturing: 
Freedom of Expression and Belief, 
Associational and Organizational 
Rights, Rule of Law, and Personal 
Autonomy and Individual Rights. 
Takes values 1-7 with higher values 
indicating suppressed civil liberties 
Freedom 
House 
Orthogonal on 
Political 
governance 
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Table 5. Summary statistics 
Variable Obs  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Jobs created 53761 228.63 463.65 0.00 19000.00 
Capital invested 53761 69.40 275.76 0.00 20000.00 
GDP 52879 3020.00 3930.00 1.72 16000.00 
GDP per person employed 52552 16970.95 10595.55 663.00 51860.00 
FDI Inflows 53605 4.47 5.93 -16.09 173.45 
Trade 53408 89.16 72.36 0.31 439.66 
Ores and metals exports 51195 5.43 8.70 0.00 85.97 
Fuel exports 51221 17.23 23.55 0.00 99.79 
Gross enrolment ratio, secondary 39529 80.84 16.13 7.57 124.61 
Gross enrolment ratio, tertiary 42142 36.48 22.62 0.72 117.89 
Institutional quality 53761 68.01 7.90 24.04 90.92 
Political Governance 53630 2.18 8.74 -10 10 
Civil liberties suppression 53709 3.77 1.69 1.00 7.00 
 
Table 6. Classification of activities by investment motivation 
 
Motivation Business Activity 
Market Seeking 
 Business Services 
 Construction 
 Customer Contact Centre 
 Maintenance & Servicing 
 Retail 
 Sales, Marketing & Support 
Resource Seeking 
 Electricity 
 Extraction 
Efficiency Seeking 
 Construction 
 Logistics, Distribution & Transportation 
 Recycling 
 Manufacturing 
Strategic Assets Seeking 
 Design, Development & Testing 
 Education & Training 
 Headquarters 
 ICT & Internet Infrastructure 
 Research & Development 
 Technical Support Centre 
 Shared Services Centre 
 Manufacturing 
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Table 7. Regression analysis of the effect of polity and civil liberties suppression on FDI from democratic and autocratic home countries (Dependent variable logarithm of 
jobs created) 
  Democratic 
Countries 
   Autocratic 
Countries 
 
 All Countries Excluding 
Russia 
Excluding 
China 
(Destination) 
China & 
UAE 
China, 
Russia & 
UAE 
Russia & 
UAE 
China 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
GDP 0.09883*** 0.10042*** 0.10275*** 0.09556*** 0.08991*** 0.11247*** 0.06055 
 (0.00897) (0.00919) (0.00962) (0.03454) (0.02588) (0.02880) (0.05949) 
GDP per person employed -0.00271* -0.00290** -0.00363** -0.02456*** -0.01288*** -0.00481 -0.03107** 
 (0.00140) (0.00144) (0.00147) (0.00712) (0.00465) (0.00511) (0.01277) 
FDI inflows -0.00290** -0.00302** -0.00278* 0.01104 0.00269 0.00013 0.00549 
 (0.00147) (0.00149) (0.00151) (0.00984) (0.00713) (0.00998) (0.01034) 
Trade -0.00076** -0.00076** -0.00072** 0.00202 0.00130 0.00350** -0.00018 
 (0.00032) (0.00032) (0.00032) (0.00199) (0.00152) (0.00175) (0.00258) 
Ores and metals exports  -0.00217** -0.00206* -0.00264** 0.00145 -0.00005 0.00541 -0.00555 
 (0.00108) (0.00109) (0.00107) (0.00577) (0.00432) (0.00595) (0.00711) 
Fuel exports  -0.00184 -0.00204 -0.00235 0.00033 0.00302** 0.00336* -0.00167 
 (0.00440) (0.00405) (0.00650) (0.00183) (0.00148) (0.00176) (0.00363) 
Gross enrolment ratio, secondary -0.00706*** -0.00705*** -0.00667*** 0.00314 -0.00388 -0.00661** 0.00403 
 (0.00077) (0.00078) (0.00085) (0.00365) (0.00256) (0.00279) (0.00557) 
Gross enrolment ratio, tertiary (ORTH) -0.00313*** -0.01574*** -0.00256*** -0.01817* -0.02654*** -0.02605*** -0.02016 
 (0.00056) (0.00057) (0.00357) (0.00270) (0.00769) (0.00283) (0.00418) 
Institutional quality 0.00605*** 0.00627*** 0.00772*** -0.01217* -0.00738 -0.00618 -0.00875 
 (0.00178) (0.00181) (0.00207) (0.00695) (0.00568) (0.00696) (0.01120) 
Political governance 0.02220*** 0.02246*** 0.01845*** 0.01571* 0.02267*** 0.01830** 0.01797 
 (0.00176) (0.00180) (0.00331) (0.00942) (0.00710) (0.00821) (0.01655) 
Civil liberties suppression (ORTH) -0.01604*** -0.00318*** -0.01282*** 0.00488* 0.00237 0.00258 0.00466 
 (0.00280) (0.00286) (0.00058) (0.00999) (0.00210) (0.00880) (0.01911) 
Constant 2.25606*** 2.17241*** 2.00389*** 1.96183 3.19356*** 2.35732** 4.05383** 
 (0.27987) (0.28683) (0.31866) (1.20885) (0.95021) (1.04369) (1.83191) 
        
Observations 33676 33055 26008 1309 1930 1387 543 
Adjusted R-squared 0.14234 0.14276 0.14212 0.26674 0.22972 0.23735 0.23471 
VIF 3.45 3.48 3.41 3.86 4.34 3.98 3.71 
Time effects 3.88*** 3.82*** 3.84*** 0.55 0.55 0.58 0.56 
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Sector effects 118.62*** 117.76*** 87.62*** 15.63 16.16*** 16.88*** 9.09*** 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 8. Regression analysis of the effect of civil liberties suppression and moderating factors on FDI from democratic home countries by investment motive (Dependent 
variable logarithm of jobs created) 
    Democratic 
Countries 
    
 Resource 
Seeking 
Efficiency 
Seeking 
Market 
Seeking 
Strategic 
Asset 
Seeking 
Resource 
Seeking 
Efficiency 
Seeking 
Market 
Seeking 
Strategic 
Asset 
Seeking 
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
GDP 0.01166 0.04002* 0.10180*** 0.06067*** 0.00586 0.04311* 0.09096*** 0.05806*** 
 (0.04725) (0.02109) (0.00996) (0.01749) (0.04968) (0.02224) (0.01030) (0.01783) 
GDP per person employed -0.01555* -0.01077*** -0.01013*** 0.00739*** -0.01590* -0.01057*** -0.01172*** 0.00922*** 
 (0.00835) (0.00333) (0.00156) (0.00264) (0.00871) (0.00338) (0.00157) (0.00270) 
FDI inflows -0.01270 0.00071 -0.00280 -0.00203 -0.01261 0.00059 -0.00324* -0.00142 
 (0.00942) (0.00321) (0.00181) (0.00245) (0.00944) (0.00321) (0.00181) (0.00246) 
Trade -0.00376* -0.00296*** -0.00076** -0.00131** -0.00395* -0.00287*** -0.00091** -0.00155*** 
 (0.00202) (0.00065) (0.00038) (0.00056) (0.00209) (0.00067) (0.00038) (0.00056) 
Ores and metals exports  -0.00161 0.00063 -0.00434*** -0.00501*** -0.00179 0.00076 -0.00356*** -0.00585*** 
 (0.00350) (0.00270) (0.00125) (0.00187) (0.00353) (0.00275) (0.00125) (0.00188) 
Fuel exports  0.00727*** 0.00524*** -0.00315*** 0.00103 0.00680** 0.00567*** -0.00225*** -0.00060 
 (0.00254) (0.00121) (0.00046) (0.00087) (0.00268) (0.00138) (0.00054) (0.00108) 
Gross enrolment ratio, secondary -0.01099*** -0.01041*** -0.00133 -0.00856*** -0.01123*** -0.01033*** -0.00018 -0.00950*** 
 (0.00401) (0.00159) (0.00089) (0.00141) (0.00431) (0.00164) (0.00091) (0.00150) 
Gross enrolment ratio, tertiary -0.00305 -0.00799 -0.02150*** 0.00502 -0.00339 -0.00172 0.00175** -0.00322 
 (0.00343) (0.00123) (0.00063) (0.00100) (0.07094) (0.03483) (0.00070) (0.00109) 
Institutional quality 0.00486 0.00597 0.00082 0.01109*** 0.00545 0.00583 0.00100 0.01143*** 
 (0.00972) (0.00398) (0.00210) (0.00316) (0.00986) (0.00399) (0.00212) (0.00316) 
Political governance 0.03850*** -0.00175 0.02889*** 0.00151 0.03858*** -0.00188 0.02112*** 0.00463 
 (0.01300) (0.00427) (0.00206) (0.00279) (0.01467) (0.00520) (0.00244) (0.00348) 
Civil liberties suppression (CL) 0.04169*** -0.00195 -0.00019 -0.00620*** 0.01935 -0.01538 -0.05013*** -0.00728*** 
 (0.01541) (0.00886) (0.00272) (0.00515) (0.00414) (0.00135) (0.01566) (0.02557) 
CL* Gross enrolment ratio, secondary     -0.00024 0.00007 -0.00082*** 0.00011 
     (0.00075) (0.00038) (0.00017) (0.00028) 
CL* Gross enrolment ratio, tertiary 
(ORTH) 
    0.00047 -0.00016 -0.00067*** -0.00081*** 
     (0.00083) (0.00037) (0.00014) (0.00028) 
Constant 5.63048*** 3.20267*** 1.65365*** 3.17943*** 4.78482*** 3.11877*** 1.90039*** 3.29175*** 
 (1.39145) (0.61986) (0.32894) (0.53958) (1.41510) (0.64694) (0.33294) (0.53930) 
         
39 
 
Observations 1012 5498 16343 10823 1012 5498 16343 10823 
Adjusted R-squared 0.14180 0.12440 0.39624 0.18658 0.14028 0.12414 0.39731 0.18727 
VIF 3.20 1.37 4.09 2.53 4.72 5.08 4.13 4.64 
Time effects 3.52*** 3.67*** 3.05 3.86*** 3.53*** 3.44*** 2.72*** 4.26*** 
Sector effects 33.07*** 33.58*** 328.19*** 78.03*** 32.92*** 32.98*** 329.75*** 78.96*** 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 9. Regression analysis of the effect of civil liberties suppression and moderating factors on FDI from autocratic home countries by investment motive (Dependent 
variable logarithm of jobs created) 
    Autocratic 
Countries 
    
 Resource 
Seeking 
Efficiency 
Seeking 
Market 
Seeking 
Strategic 
Asset 
Seeking 
Resource 
Seeking 
Efficiency 
Seeking 
Market 
Seeking 
Strategic 
Asset 
Seeking 
 (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) 
         
GDP 0.02394 0.17891** 0.11446** 0.08741 0.04020 0.16530* 0.11055** 0.08131 
 (0.23851) (0.07819) (0.04747) (0.07559) (0.04695) (0.08429) (0.04726) (0.08044) 
GDP per person employed 0.02032 -0.03540* -0.02076** 0.01135 0.01482* -0.02705 -0.02247** 0.01192 
 (0.05628) (0.01801) (0.00950) (0.01472) (0.00843) (0.01803) (0.01104) (0.01499) 
FDI inflows 0.04793 -0.00196 0.03243 -0.00459 -0.01129 0.00331 0.03068 -0.00499 
 (0.12771) (0.01642) (0.02326) (0.01161) (0.00874) (0.01675) (0.02337) (0.01179) 
Trade 0.00536 0.00088 -0.00033 -0.00049 -0.00330* 0.00160 0.00005 -0.00020 
 (0.00949) (0.00447) (0.00304) (0.00372) (0.00197) (0.00431) (0.00305) (0.00380) 
Ores and metals exports  0.13973** 0.03366*** -0.00034 -0.00449 -0.00035 0.02816*** -0.00146 -0.00580 
 (0.06332) (0.00951) (0.00597) (0.02084) (0.00351) (0.01045) (0.00594) (0.02120) 
Fuel exports  -0.00867 0.00412 0.00287 -0.00296 0.00577** 0.00239 0.00386 -0.00225 
 (0.00794) (0.00413) (0.00247) (0.00441) (0.00264) (0.00431) (0.00254) (0.00463) 
Gross enrolment ratio, secondary 0.00672 0.00377 -0.00532 0.00148 -0.00625 -0.00277 -0.00492 -0.00225 
 (0.01702) (0.00847) (0.00505) (0.00699) (0.00417) (0.00930) (0.00541) (0.00668) 
Gross enrolment ratio, tertiary (ORTH) 0.00574 -0.01792 0.00212 -0.00035 -0.00012 -0.00239 -0.10820* -0.00373 
 (0.01748) (0.00579) (0.01547) (0.02277) (0.00401) (0.00671) (0.06389) (0.12670) 
Institutional quality -0.01940 -0.00473 0.01328 -0.02067 -0.00532 -0.00633 0.00755 -0.01944 
 (0.02873) (0.01572) (0.01210) (0.01558) (0.00893) (0.01555) (0.01246) (0.01613) 
Political governance -0.10795* 0.01361 0.01309 0.00434 -0.03708*** 0.02812 0.01527 0.01204 
 (0.05992) (0.01952) (0.01455) (0.02234) (0.01407) (0.01979) (0.01582) (0.02356) 
Civil liberties suppression (CL) 0.10202 0.00564 -0.01686 -0.00147 -0.05571 -0.11181 0.00180 -0.13837 
 (0.09034) (0.02377) (0.00368) (0.00547) (0.06878) (0.11334) (0.00401) (0.00525) 
CL* Gross enrolment ratio, secondary     0.00005 0.00128 0.00099 0.00175 
     (0.00079) (0.00129) (0.00073) (0.00141) 
CL* Gross enrolment ratio, tertiary 
(ORTH) 
    -0.00028 0.00256** -0.00044 0.00055 
     (0.00079) (0.00128) (0.00072) (0.00097) 
Constant -1.57028 0.66142 0.00735 3.79783* 4.60786*** 0.10739 0.51307 4.21050* 
 (5.95451) (2.13796) (1.49988) (2.22665) (1.37250) (2.31482) (1.49915) (2.42253) 
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Observations 1064 199 788 270 1064 199 788 270 
Adjusted R-squared 0.29962 0.28676 0.39915 0.19002 0.12884 0.29695 0.40274 0.18772 
VIF 2.63 4.76 4.00 4.79 4.90 3.68 3.20 3.06 
Time effects 0.27 1.87* 2.86*** 1.06 0.30 2.04** 2.16** 1.08 
Sector effects 47.25*** 12.47*** 34.61*** 15.45*** 238.73*** 14.77*** 35.79*** 15.61*** 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses   * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Figure 1. Marginal effects of secondary and tertiary education and civil liberties (CL) suppression on 
FDI for democratic countries and strategic asset-seeking investments (solid lines indicate a 
statistically-significant effect) 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Marginal effects of secondary and tertiary education and civil liberties (CL) suppression on 
FDI for autocratic countries and strategic asset-seeking investments (solid lines indicate a statistically-
significant effect) 
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Figure 3. Marginal effects of secondary and tertiary education and civil liberties (CL) suppression on 
FDI for democratic countries and market-seeking investments (solid lines indicate a statistically-
significant effect) 
 
 
Figure 4. Marginal effects of secondary and tertiary education and civil liberties (CL) suppression on 
FDI for autocratic countries and market-seeking investments (solid lines indicate a statistically-
significant effect) 
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Figure 5. Marginal effects of secondary and tertiary education and civil liberties (CL) suppression on 
FDI for democratic countries and resource-seeking investments (solid lines indicate a statistically-
significant effect) 
 
Figure 6. Marginal effects of secondary and tertiary education and civil liberties (CL) suppression on 
FDI for autocratic countries and resource-seeking investments (solid lines indicate a statistically-
significant effect) 
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Figure 7. Marginal effects of secondary and tertiary education and civil liberties (CL) suppression on 
FDI for democratic countries and efficiency-seeking investments (solid lines indicate a statistically-
significant effect)
 
 
Figure 8. Marginal effects of secondary and tertiary education and civil liberties (CL) suppression on 
FDI for autocratic countries and efficiency-seeking investments (solid lines indicate a statistically-
significant effect) 
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Appendix 1. List of recipient countries 
Albania Algeria Angola Argentina Armenia Azerbaijan Bahamas Bahrain Bangladesh Belarus Bolivia 
Botswana Brazil Bulgaria Burkina Faso Cameroon Chile China Colombia Congo(DRC) Costa Rica 
Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) Croatia Cuba Czech Republic Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt El 
Salvador Estonia Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Ghana Guatemala Guinea Guinea-Bissau Guyana Haiti 
Honduras Hungary India Indonesia Iran Iraq Jamaica Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Kuwait Latvia Lebanon 
Liberia Libya Lithuania Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Mali Malta Mexico Moldova Mongolia 
Morocco Mozambique Myanmar (Burma) Namibia Nicaragua Niger Nigeria North Korea Oman 
Pakistan Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Qatar Republic of the Congo 
Romania 
Russia Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia Sierra Leone Slovakia Slovenia Somalia South Africa South Korea 
Sri Lanka Sudan Suriname Tanzania Thailand Togo Trinidad & Tobago Tunisia Turkey UAE Uganda 
Ukraine Uruguay Venezuela Vietnam Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe  
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Appendix 2. Correlation Matrix 
 
Jobs 
created 
GDP 
GDP per 
person 
employed 
FDI 
Inflows 
Trade 
Ores and 
metals 
exports 
Fuel 
exports 
Gross 
enrolment 
ratio, 
secondary 
Gross 
enrolment 
ratio, 
tertiary 
(orth-
secondary) 
Institutional 
quality 
Polity 
Civil 
liberties 
suppression 
(orth - 
Polity) 
Jobs created 1            
GDP 0.0805* 1           
GDP per person 
employed -0.1319* -0.3580* 1          
FDI Inflows -0.0568* -0.2803* 0.3595* 1         
Trade -0.1259* -0.4223* 0.6601* 0.5498* 1        
Ores and metals 
exports -0.0235* -0.2126* -0.0215* 0.0356* -0.1529* 1       
Fuel exports -0.0828* -0.1520* 0.0937* -0.0085 0.0049 -0.0657* 1      
Gross enrolment 
ratio, secondary -0.0807* -0.3091* 0.6810* 0.1312* 0.2908* 0.0552* 0.1011* 1     
Gross enrolment 
ratio, tertiary 
(orth-secondary) -0.0096 -0.2196* 0.2968* 0.0359* 0.1760* 0.1262* 0.0630* 0 1    
Institutional 
quality -0.0825* -0.2506* 0.6282* 0.3525* 0.5681* -0.0169* -0.1368* 0.4637* 0.0995* 1   
Political 
governance 0.0685* -0.1697* 0.0757* -0.0591* -0.1326* 0.2501* -0.1521* 0.1152* 0.3840* 0.0121* 1  
Civil liberties 
suppression 
(orth - Polity) 0.0630* 0.2347* -0.1873* -0.1557* -0.2192* 0.0431* 0.0816* -0.2121* 0.1642* -0.2331* 0 1 
* significant at 5%;
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Appendix 3. Orthogonalisation regressions for Civil Liberties Suppression and Political governance  
 Political governance 
Civil Liberties Suppression -3.8786*** 
 (0.0121) 
Constant 16.8115*** 
 (0.0372) 
  
Observations 53630 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5599 
 
 Secondary Education 
Tertiary Education 1.05923*** 
 (0.00522) 
Constant -46.8049*** 
 (0.3845) 
  
Observations 36600 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5206 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1 
 
Appendix 4. Regression Analysis of the effect of civil liberties suppression and moderating factors on FDI from China 
(as home country) by investment motive (Dependent variable logarithm of Jobs created) 
 Resource 
Seeking 
Efficiency Seeking Market Seeking Strategic Asset 
Seeking 
 (24) (25) (26) (27) 
GDP 0.03082 0.21132* 0.12353 0.12620 
 (0.54999) (0.11884) (0.12034) (0.08998) 
GDP per person employed 0.18779 -0.04225*** 0.04567** 0.00573 
 (0.22899) (0.00271) (0.01907) (0.01581) 
FDI inflows 0.19987 -0.01797 0.06272** -0.00701 
 (0.30341) (0.02137) (0.02733) (0.01157) 
Trade 0.02256 0.00684*** 0.00143 0.00043 
 (0.01854) (0.00056) (0.00365) (0.00410) 
Ores and metals exports  0.31395*** 0.01372 0.00256 -0.00784 
 (0.00978) (0.01540) (0.00758) (0.02068) 
Fuel exports  -0.04668 0.01348 -0.00151 -0.00076 
 (0.05059) (0.00835) (0.00488) (0.00479) 
Gross enrolment ratio, 
secondary 
0.00453 -0.00587 0.00169 -0.00253 
 (0.03280) (0.00968) (0.01096) (0.00741) 
Gross enrolment ratio, tertiary 
(ORTH) 
0.69139 0.01152 0.08004 -0.17359 
 (0.81419) (0.00990) (0.00617) (0.16613) 
Institutional quality -0.08662 0.01904 0.02903 0.02895* 
 (0.08118) (0.02057) (0.02114) (0.01707) 
Political governance -0.38267 0.04297 0.03000 0.03781 
 (0.45930) (0.03377) (0.03856) (0.02359) 
Civil liberties suppression 
(ORTH) 
-0.00473 -0.01221 0.00794 -0.00249 
 (0.03707) (0.15727) (0.25626) (0.00627) 
CL* Gross enrolment ratio, 
secondary 
-0.00367 -0.00058 -0.00142 0.00161 
 (0.00549) (0.00201) (0.00294) (0.00189) 
CL* Gross enrolment ratio, 
tertiary (ORTH) 
-0.00237 0.00139 -0.00091 0.00066 
 (0.01108) (0.00199) (0.00140) (0.00112) 
Constant 5.79207 -2.05136 -2.42765 3.51553 
 (14.47008) (3.78779) (4.16252) (2.80614) 
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Observations 310 102 186 224 
Adjusted R-squared 0.06636 0.25071 0.61080 0.18714 
VIF 2.45 2.51 1.79 1.72 
Time effects 0.51 0.51 0.71 1.28 
Sector effects 5.86*** 5.99*** 46.47*** 8.91*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
